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THE EFFECT OF TERRITORIAL
ADMINISTRATION BY INTERNATIONAL




In recent years, there has been a striking resurgence in the use of a
particular international policy device: the granting of certain rights over
territorial administration to international organizations. I term this policy
device international territorial administration (ITA), and its operation can be
seen in certain UN-run camps housing forced migrants, many of which are
in Africa, as well as in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and East Timor.' In
this article, I will explore the role of ITA in shaping the local community in
the territorial unit concerned. To what extent does it play a part in the
construction or reconstruction of a particular cultural, political, economic
and social system?
II. THE TWO MODES OF INTERNATIONAL TERRITORIAL ADMINISTRATION:
GOVERNANCE AND COMMUNITY-BUILDING
Elsewhere, I have defined international territorial administration in the
following manner:
Each project involves a claim made by an international
organization relating to territorial administration. Here,
"territorial administration" refers to a formally constituted,
locally based management structure operating with respect
to a particular territorial unit; it can be limited (e.g., a
territorial program concerned with certain matters) or
* Whewell Scholar, Trinity College, Cambridge CB2 1TQ (rgw25@cam.ac.uk). Warm thanks are
due to James Crawford for his comments on an earlier draft. This article draws from the
author's doctoral research on the administration of territory by international organizations,
which as been supported by a British Academy Studentship, a Dissertaion Award from the
Academic Council on the UN System, and, from Cambridge University, a Humanitarian Trust
Senior Studentship and Whewell Scholarship.
I For the idea that ITA constitutes an international policy device, and a comparative purposive
analysis of current projects and historical precedents running back to the creation of the League
of Nations in 1920, see Ralph Wilde, From Danzig to East Timor and Beyond: the Role of International
Territorial Administration, 95(3) AM. J. INT'L L. 583 (2001).
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plenary (e.g., a territorial government) in scope. The
international organization asserts the right either to
supervise and control the operation of this structure by local
actors, or to operate the structure directly. The right is
exercised from within the territory, and can pertain to the
structure as a whole, or certain parts of it (e.g., the
legislature). This activity should be contrasted with merely
monitoring and/or assisting local actors in operating such a
structure, although the distinction is sometimes difficult to
make in practice, particularly in the case of conduct and
assistance. The spatial identity of the international
organization and its officials -as "international" -is distinct
from and opposed to the "local" identity of the territorial
unit and population affected, even if the organization's
activities are limited to that territory and some of the
"internationals" are actually local nationals.2
ITA can operate in two complementary modes. The first mode, which I shall
term governance ITA, involves the provision of governance in the territory
concerned. In many developing countries, host states often give over most, if
not all responsibility for running camps housing forced migrants to the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). One example
would be the Daddab camps in North-East Kenya, where UNHCR exercises
full administrative control, deciding who has the right to enter and leave and
co-ordinating the provision of food, water, shelter, and medical and
educational services by other international agencies.3 The only role played
by Kenyan authorities is the limited provision of security, and this is funded
by UNHCR. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Office of the High
Representative (OHR) asserts the right to dismiss government officials and
introduce laws.4 In Kosovo and East Timor respectively, the UN Mission in
2 Wilde, supra note 1, at 585.
3 This information is drawn from my own work in the camps; see Wilde, Beyond the Yoke:
Women's Rights in the Dadaab Refugee Camps of Kenya (London: Parliamentary Human Rights
Group, 1997), and Wilde, Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes?: Why and How UNHCR Governance of
'Development' Refugee Camps Should Be Subject to International Human Rights Law, 1 YALE HUM.
RTs. DEv. L.J. 5 (1998). See also Verdirame, Field Report, Human Rights and Refugees: the Case of
Kenya, 12 J. REFUGEE STUD. 54 (1999), and Marc-Antoine Perouse de Montclos & Peter Mwangi
Kagwanja, Refugee Camps or Cities? The Socio-economic Dynamics of the Dadaab and Kakuma Camps
in Northern Kenya, 13 J. REFUGEE STUD. 205 - 222 (2000).
1OHR is a sui generis organization that was created by the Dayton Agreement and is controlled
by the inter-state Peace Implementation Council. Its asserted right to dismiss officials and
introduce new laws is based on the vague powers OHR is given by the Dayton Peace
Agreement, Annex 10, as these powers have been interpreted by the intergovernmental Peace
Implementation Council that controls OHR. Annex 10 of the Dayton Peace Agreement
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Kosovo (UNMIK) and the United Nations Transitional Authority in East
Timor (UNTAET), assert plenary powers of territorial administration,
effectively making the UN the government of these two places.5
authorizes OHR to 'promote full compliance' with civilian aspects of the Agreement through
'maintaining dose contact' with the parties (Article II.l.b); OHR is also to 'facilitate,' as it deems
necessary, 'the resolution of any difficulties arising in connection to civil implementation.'
(Article 1I.l.d). See Bosnia and Herzegovina - Croatia - Federal Republic of Yugoslavia: General
Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina with Annexes, Done at Paris, 14
December 1995, 35 ILM 75 (1996), < http://www.ohr.int/gfa/gfa-home.htm>, [hereinafter
'Dayton Peace Agreement'], Annex 10. See also Security Council Resolution 1031, UN Doc.
S/RES/1031 (1995), 15 December 1995, 35 I.LM. 235 (1996),
<http://www.ohr.int/docu/u951215a.htm>, [hereinafter 'SC Res. 1031']. For the PIC
interpretation, see Bonn Peace Implementation Conference 1997, Bosnia and Herzegovina 1998:
Self-sustaining Structures, Conclusions, Bonn, 10 December 1997,
<http://www.ohr.int/docu/d971210a.htm>, [hereinafter 'PIC Bonn Conclusions']. On O-R's
powers generally, see e.g. Cox, The Dayton Agreement in Bosnia and Herzegovina: a Study in
Implementation Strategies, 69 BRrr. Y. B. INT'L L. 201 (1996) ['Cox 1999'] [hereinafter 'Cox']. The
purported right to dismiss government officials was cited as authority for OHR's removal of
Nikola Poplasen from the Presidency of Republika Srpksa in 1999. See OHR, Press Release,
Removal from Office of Nikola Poplasen, Sarajevo, 5 March 1999,
<http://www.ohr.int/press/p990305b.htm>; PIC Bonn Conclusions, X.2.c; and Cox, 218. As for
introducing laws, See Bonn Conclusions, X.2.b and Cox, 214. Cox remarks that OHR...
has imposed a number of major, substantive laws, on subjects including
foreign investment, vehicle licensing, privatization, media,
telecommunications and property rights ... [and] measures on important
symbolic matters, such as the design of the national flag, the design of the
currency, and the selection of the national anthem.
Cox, at 215.
5 In Kosovo, international administration was introduced in June 1999. The NATO-led force
KFOR enjoys plenary military control, and the United Nations Interim Administration Mission
in Kosovo (UNMIK) has total responsibility for the conduct of civil administration, including the
deployment of an international police force. In East Timor the United Nations Transitional
Authority in East Timor (UNTAET) was created towards the end of 1999 to take over both civil
and military administration during the transitional period before independence. For Kosovo, see
Security Council Resolution 1244, UN Doc. S/RES/1244 (1999), 10 June 1999,
<http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1999/99sc1244.htm>, [hereinafter 'SC Res. 1244']. See also
Agreement on the principles (peace plan) to move towards a resolution of the Kosovo crisis
presented to the leadership of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia by the President of Finland,
Martti Ahtisaari, representing the European Union, and Viktor Chemomyrdin, Special
Representative of the President of the Russian Federation, 3 June 1999, UN Doc. S/1999/649
<http://www.unorg/peace/kosovo/s1999649.pdf>, [hereinafter 'Kosovo Peace Plan 1999'];
Military-technical agreement between the international security force (KFOR) and the
Governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia (9 June 1999),
S/1999/682 <http://www.un.org/Reace/kosovo/s99682.pdf>, [hereinafter 'NATO - FRY -
Serb Republic Agreement 1999']. For East Timor, see Security Council Resolution 1272, 25
October 1999, UN Doc. S/RES/1272 (1999),
<http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1999/99sc272.htm > [hereinafter 'SC Res. 1272'], in
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In Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and East Timor, governance ITA is
allied to what I shall refer to as community-building ITA. Administration is
conducted not only to provide governance in the territory, but also "to
construct or reconstruct institutions, broadly defined, including material
infrastructure, public bodies, commercial enterprises, media and
telecommunications, and civil-society organizations. ''6  In Bosnia and
Herzegovina, the Dayton Agreement sets out the new constitutional
structure of the state, and OHR exercises governmental prerogatives to
support the implementation of this new structure.7 In Kosovo and East
Timor, by contrast, international organizations have been mandated to
initiate and/or support the development of new constitutional and
governmental structures from scratch. In Kosovo, this mandate is
complicated by the uncertain future status of the territory. Thus, on the one
hand, UNMIK has the responsibility for,
... establishing and overseeing the development of provisional
democratic self-governing institutions to ensure conditions for a
peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants of Kosovo,8
and is also responsible for
*. . overseeing and supporting the consolidation of Kosovo's
local provisional institutions and other peace-building activities. 9
particular articles 1, 2(a) and (b), 3(a) and 6. See also Indonesia - Portugal, Agreement on the
Question of East Timor, 5 May 1999,
<http:/ /www.un.org/peace/etimor99/agreement/agreeFrame EngO1.html>, Appendix, A
Constitutional Framework for a Special Autonomy for East Timor,
<http://www.urorg/peace/etimor99/agreement/agreeFrame-EngO2html> [hereinafter
'Indonesia-Portugal Agreement 1999']. For a discussion of some of the legal and policy
consequences of regarding the UN the government of Kosovo and East Timor, as that term is
understood in international law, see Ralph Wilde, The Complex Role of the Legal Adviser When
International Organizations Administer Territory, 2001 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 251.
6 Wilde, supra note 1, at 601.
7 The constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina is contained in the Dayton Agreement, supra note
4, Annex 4. OHR's community-building mandate is based on the same provisions in the Dayton
Agreement as its purported powers to introduce certain administrative measures outlined
earlier. For these provisions, and the administrative powers that have been interpreted out of
them, see supra note 2 and accompanying text.
sSC Res. 1244, supra note 5, para 10. In para 11(c), this endeavour is described as
organizing and overseeing the development of provisional institutions for
democratic and autonomous self government pending a political
settlement...
9 SC Res. 1244, supra note 5, para 11(d).
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On the other hand, however, UNMIK is also mandated to facilitate the
"political process designed to determine Kosovo's future status" and, on the
outcome of this process, it is responsible for
overseeing the transfer of authority from Kosovo's
provisional institutions to institutions established under a political
settlement.10
In East Timor, the institution-building mandate is comparatively
straightforward, in that the future status of the territory, as a state, is clear.
UNTAET is mandated to "support capacity-building for self-government,""
and the Security Council,
... [s]tresses the need for UNTAET to consult and co-operate
closely with the East Timorese people in order to carry out its
mandate effectively with a view to the development of local
democratic institutions, including an independent East Timorese
human rights institution... 12
In 'all three places, international organizations are also responsible for
promoting, either directly or through appointees, the development of public
services, and, more generally, economic development and (re)construction.13
10 SC Res. 1244, supra note 5, para 11(f).
11 SC Res. 1272, supra note 5, para 2(e).
12 Id.
13 For Bosnia and Herzegovina, see the Dayton Agreement, supra note 4, Annex 9, which
establishes a Commission on Public Corporation to set up corporations that will operate public
facilities such as the post and telecommunications systems. Certain members of this
Commission are appointed by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. In
Kosovo, the Security Council gives UNMIK responsibility for '[slupporting the reconstruction of
key infrastructure and other economic reconstruction,' and '[s]upporting, in coordination with
international humanitarian organizations, humanitarian and disaster relief aid,' (SC Res. 1244,
supra note 5, paras 11(g) and (h) respectively). It also '[e]ncourages all Member States and
international organizations to contribute to economic and social reconstruction as well as to the
safe return of refugees and displaced persons,' and
[wielcomes the work in hand in the European Union and other international
organizations to develop a comprehensive approach to the economic
development and stabilization of the region affected by the Kosovo crisis,
including the implementation of a Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe
with broad international participation in order to further the promotion of
democracy, economic prosperity, stability and regional cooperation ....
(SC Res. 1244, supra note 5, paras 13 and 17 respectively). In East Timor, UNTAET is mandated
to 'assist in the development of civil and social services,' SC Res 1272, supra note 5, para 2 (c);
Iensure the coordination and delivery of humanitarian assistance, rehabilitation and
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In Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina, the UN is responsible for assisting in the
development of local police forces.14
When a community-building mandate is granted alongside a governance
mandate, the two are formally linked and the point of community building
ITA is to foster conditions so that governance ITA is eventually unnecessary.
Thus in Kosovo and East Timor, part of the community-building mandate
involves the creation of local institutions to which the UN can then transfer
its administrative authority.15 Moreover, the community-building mandate
may be linked to a particular agenda as far as the territorial status of the unit
is concerned. Thus community-building in Bosnia and Herzegovina is
attempting to shore-up the idea of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a multi-ethnic
state,16 and in East Timor it is intended to create conditions where the
development assistance,' SC Res. 1272, supra note 5, article 2(d); and 'assist in the establishment
of conditions for sustainable development,' SC Res. 1272, supra note 5, article 2(f). In Security
Council 1272, the Security Council "calls upon all parties to cooperate with humanitarian and
human rights organizations so as to ensure... the safe return of refugee and displaced persons."
SC Res. 1272, supra note 5, article 10; see also articles 11 and 12. It also
[w]elcomes the intention of the Secretary-General to establish a Trust Fund
available for, inter alia, the rehabilitation of essential infrastructure,
including the building of basic institutions, the functioning of public
services and utilities, and the salaries of local civil servants...
and
[elncourages member states and international agencies and organizations to
provide personnel, equipment and other resources to UNTAET as
requested by the Secretary-General, including for the building of basic
institutions and capacity ...
SC Res. 1272, supra note 5, articles 13 and 14 respectively.
14 For Bosnia-Herzegovina, see the Dayton Agreement, supra note 4, Annex 11. For Kosovo, see
SC Res. 1244, supra note 5, para 11(i).
Is In East Timor, the Security Council,
[s]tresses the need for UNTAET to consult and co-operate closely with the
East Timorese people in order to carry out its mandate effectively with a
view to the development of local democratic institutions, including an
independent East Timorese human rights institution, and the transfer to
these institutions of its administrative and public service functions;
See SC Res. 1272, supra note 4, para 2(e) (emphasis added). In Kosovo, once the above
mentioned 'provisional institutions' are established, UNMIK is responsible for '[t]ransferring...
its administrative responsibilities' to these institutions. See SC Res. 1244, supra note 5, para
11(d).
16 For example, the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which forms part of the 'civilian'
aspects of the Dayton Peace Agreement which OHR is charged with promoting, is "[clommitted
to the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina in
accordance with international law." Dayton Agreement, supra note 4, Annex 4, preamble
para. 6.
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territory can become an independent state.'7 In Kosovo, the ambivalence of
the community-building agenda, creating conditions for "substantial
autonomy" within the FRY, while at the same time anticipating some future
process where the status of Kosovo will be determined, and thus potentially
altered, reflects the uncertain future of Kosovo as far as international policy
is concerned.
In UN-run camps for forced migrants, by striking contrast, the UN is not
given any explicit community-building mandate in law. Here the agenda for
the unit is very different from that in Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina and
East Timor, and the purpose for administration reflects this different agenda.
As far as the law is concerned, many camp occupants are only resident on a
"temporary" basis, since this residency is bound up in their status, whether
officially recognized or not, as refugees.'8 Because of this "temporary"
residency, there is no sovereignty agenda as far as the unit where these
people reside - the camp - is concerned. Indeed, the unit may not be
presented officially as a distinct entity at all; camps may not show up on
government maps, for example. The agenda is, rather, to provide
"temporary" assistance to the "temporary" residents.
III. THE RELATIONSHIP BEFWEEN GOVERNANCE AND COMMUNITY-BUILDING
MANDATES
I would like to question the distinction between administration, on the
one hand, and community-building, on the other, which can be identified in
the Kosovo, East Timor and UN-run camp ITA projects outlined above. In
Kosovo and East Timor, the relevant legal instruments delineate governance
and community-building responsibilities separately. Even when these two
types of responsibilities are delineated in the same sentence, they are each
presented as separate from the other. For example, UNMIK is mandated "to
provide transitional administration while establishing and overseeing the
development of provisional democratic self-governing institutions."' 9 As far
as the relationship between governance and community building is
17 For example, the Security Council describes 'a process of transition under the authority of the
United Nations towards independence,' SC Res. 1272, supra note 5, preamble para. 3.
Is For the applicable international refugee law in most African countries, see Convention relating
to the Status of Refugees, 28 July 1951,18 U.N.T.S, 137
<http://www.unhcr.ch/refworld/legal/instruments/asylum/1951eng.htm> (visited 20
Dec. 2000) and Organization of African Unity Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of
Refugee Problems in Africa (20 June 1974) 14 U.N.T.S. 691. Many of these camps house a
broader class of forced migrants which may include, but is not limited to, forced migrants who
qualify for refugee status.
19 SC Res. 1244, supra note 5, para 10.
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concerned, the only link made is that administrative powers will be
transferred to institutions that are created as part of the community-building
programme. So UNMIK is responsible for "[t]ransferring, as these
institutions [of self-government] are established, its administrative
responsibilities while overseeing and supporting the consolidation of
Kosovo's local provisional institutions and other peace-building activities
"20
In UN-run camps, no link between governance mandates and
community-building mandates is made at all, since the latter mandates do
not exist. Neither in the East Timor and Kosovo mandates, nor the refugee
camp mandates, is there any suggestion about how administration should
relate to community-building, or vice versa.
The result, therefore, is a presentation of the two modes of ITA -
governance ITA and community-building ITA - as mutually exclusive.
These modes can operate in the same place without overlapping; governance
ITA can be conducted without community-building being a factor. Such a
presentation is unfortunate, because it risks ignoring the way in which
governance ITA itself shapes the community it is concerned with.
Governance ITA has this effect in at least six different ways. First, the way
that governance ITA distinguishes between different groups in the local
community can have an empowering and disempowering effect on these
groups, thereby affecting their standing in the community. Such distinctions
can occur in a wide range of administrative matters, from consultation in
decision-making to the provision of food, water and other assistance, and the
running of education and training facilities. They can arise out of an active
decision on the part of international officials - for example choosing to
consult certain individuals - or simply because only certain groups become
involved in a particular public service - for example if the children
attending schools are mostly boys. In either case, governance engages with
society, and shapes it. For community groups, the privilege of being
consulted empowers such groups as representatives of their community. By
the same token, exclusion from consultation has a disempowering effect.
Equally, providing education that will be used mostly by boys may reinforce
particular gender roles in the local society.
Second, policy decisions made by international officials in the exercise of
governance ITA, for example, the decision to focus on economic
reconstruction before introducing political institutions, or to focus on early
SC Res. 1244, para 5 (d).
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elections are, of course, based on various economic and political
assumptions. Carrying out these decisions promotes these assumptions
within the social discourse of the community affected. The third way in
which international administration missions shape the local communities
affected is in the composition of these missions. The language, nationality,
religion and gender of international staff will all have an effect on the role
played by these identity signifyers locally. For example, many UN officials
in East Timor speak Portugese, the main language of the older generation
who were exiled or led the independence guerillas; very few speak Bahasa
Indonesian, the main language of those who were born after 1975 and
educated in Indonesian institutions. 2' The older elite have a linguistic
advantage over the younger generation when dealing with UN officials and
this advantage may further the relative importance and influence of these
two groups within East Timorese society.
Fourth, governance ITA shapes the community affected, through the
choice of unit within which it is conducted. Conducting governance ITA at
the level of a particular unit reinforces that unit as a meaningful basis for
collective activity. It supports an idea of community that corresponds to the
unit (in Kosovo, being "Kosovar") and undermines the idea of community
that cuts across the unit (in Kosovo, being "Yugoslav" and/or "Serb"). It
enables the sense of "self" and "other," those within and without the unit, on
which community identity can be based. Fifth, the manner in which
governance ITA is conducted - how far it is accountable, democratic, fair -
operates on a symbolic level to foster certain ideas about how governance
should and does work. It sets a precedent that will have an influence when
governance is exercised by the people of the local community.
Finally, the type of legal authority on which the ITA mandate rests has
an effect on the local community, since legal authority can involve varying
degrees of consent by local community representatives. All the
administration projects claim authority from legal processes that exclude any
local consent. In the case of Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina and East
Timor, this imposed authority comes from Resolutions of the Security
21 This is part of a wider linguistic problem, since, according to Ruth Wedgwood,
[o]nly a handful of UN staff speak Bahasa Indonesia (a Malay tongue) or
Tetun, preventing them from communicating with 80 percent of East
Timor's population. Translators offer no substitute, since few local
Timorese speak more than rudimentary English.
Ruth Wedgwood, 'Trouble in Timor,' Letter to the Editor, 79 FOREIGN AFF. 197 (Nov./Dec. 2000).
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Council passed under Chapter 7.22 It also comes from agreements signed by
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the case of Kosovo,23 and by Indonesia
and Portugal in the case of East Timor.24 In UN-run camps, it comes from
agreements made between host states and UNHCR. In Bosnia and
Herzegovina, authority for OHR's administrative powers also comes from a
process that did involve the participation of certain local actors: the Dayton
Agreement. Annex 10 of Dayton, which outlines OHR's role, is signed by
both the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina and its two constituent Entities, the
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the Republika Srpska.2s
A legal process involving the consent of certain local actors or
institutions can boost the standing of such actors or institutions in the
community concerned, and undermine the standing of other local actors or
institutions who are not involved. In this regard, it can have an ambivalent
effect if two competing actors are both involved. Thus OHR's mandate,
involving the consent of both Bosnia and Herzegovina and its two
constituent Entities, simultaneously strengthens and undermines the
authority of both the central government and the two Entity governments vis
A vis each other.26 OHR's mandate thus acknowledges, and also reinforces,
the tensions between the Entities and the central government. A legal
process that excludes the consent of any local representatives, thereby
imposing international administration, can have a disempowering effect on
all in the community affected, and a corrosive effect on the very idea of the
community itself. An imposed mandate symbolizes, and exacerbates, the
weakness of the community on which it is imposed.
To conclude, international territorial administration takes place at a
significant moment in the lives of the local people affected, and at an
important point in the development of the communities within which these
people live. It can have a profound affect on such communities, quite apart
from whether it has any community-building agenda. Indeed, when such an
n For Bosnia-Herzegovina, see SC Res. 1031, supra note 5. For Kosovo, see SC Res. 1244, supra
note 5. For East Timor, see SC Res. 1272, supra note S.
23 For Kosovo, see NATO - FRY - Serb Republic Agreement 1999, supra note 5. Given that
Kosovo is considered legally part of the Serb Republic within the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia, this agreement does, formally, involve 'local consent.' However, the
meaningfulness of this consent, as far as Kosovar input is concerned, is undermined by the
reason for the agreement, which is to reverse the disempowerment and disenfranchisement -
both constitutionally and in a wider sense - of Kosovo within the Serb Republic and the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia.
24 See Indonesia-Portugal Agreement 1999, supra note 5.
2 See the Dayton agreement, supra note 4.
2 Bosnia and Herzegovina is constituted ambivalently as a state divided up into two Entities, see
the Constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Annex, Dayton Agreement, Annex 4, supra note 4.
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agenda does exist, this agenda may be undercut, as well as supported, by the
exercise of what I have termed governance ITA. Communities can be
reinforced and undermined; political, cultural and social identities can be
entrenched and transformed. Understandings of international territorial
administration by policy-makers need to take this into account, and
incorporate a greater appreciation of the effect administration has on the
development of the local community affected.27
2 For the sections covering administrative responsibilities, see supra note 3. For the sections covering
community-building responsibilities, see supra notes, and accompanying text, 4, 10 and II (for Bosnia-
Herzegovina); 6 - 8, 10 and 11 (for Kosovo) and 8 - 11 (for East Timor).

